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Any attempt to evaluate national tax policy must deal with at least three
major problems. First, when looking at a particular tax or proposed
reform, we must account for interactions among different tax instru-
ments. The distributional and efficiency effects of one tax reform depend
fundamentally on other taxes that might be levied on other transactions
or by other units of government. Second, if the reform applies to a
broad-based tax, we must account for other reactions of economic agents.
A particular excise tax might be evaluated in a partial equilibrium
framework, for example, but the corporate income tax requires a general
equilibrium model. Third, if the reform is more than incremental, we
must calculate a whole new counterfactual equilibrium rather than rely
upon local approximations around the initial equilibrium.
This book presents the structure of a numerical general equilibrium
model designed to deal with these problems. The model includes many
features of the U.S. economy, including all major taxes, savings and
investment behavior, production, consumption, government transac-
tions, and trade. The model can be used to evaluate particular proposals
or to study other more general tax issues. Production is disaggregated in
the model in order to capture the efficiency effects of factor reallocations,
and consumers are disaggregated in order to capture distributional
effects. The book contains considerable detail on all of these specifica-
tions and on all of the data used. We also provide results from a number
of applications.
This modeling activity is part of a broader range of developments, both
within public finance and within the applied general equilibrium litera-
ture. Most recent tax policy evaluations have been based on the pioneer-
ing work of Arnold Harberger (1962, 1966), who first included both
efficiency and distributional considerations in a general equilibrium
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model. Many applications and extensions of this approach are described
in the survey by Charles McLure (1975). These analytical models were
limited to few production sectors, however, and can only consider incre-
mental changes. With the development of computer methods and tech-
niques such as the algorithm of Scarf (1973), more detailed and sophisti-
cated models began to appear. These models have been applied not only
to U.S. tax policy, but to other countries and other issues such as trade or
development policy. Some of these models are reviewed in Fullerton,
Henderson, and Shoven (1984), and in Shoven and Whalley (1984). This
book fits squarely into this public finance and modeling literature.
The original Harberger approach considered the allocation of fixed
factor supplies in a single equilibrium period. In our model, we disaggre-
gate production in order to capture more of these static effects, and we
allow for endogenous supply of labor in each period. One of the major
features of our model, however, is its capability of analyzing dynamic
effects through a sequencing of equilibria. An endogenous supply of
savings in any one period is added to the capital stock for the next period,
and a time profile for the economy is calculated. Welfare implications
proceed from the comparison of alternative intertemporal consumption
profiles that are generated by alternative tax regimes. This approach has
the further advantage that it does not just compare steady-state growth
paths, but considers the transition from one to another.
12.1 Results from the Model
One of the major applications of our model involves the integration of
corporate and personal income taxes (chapter 8). In fact, many features
of the model were designed with this application in mind. We include in
our model the personal factor tax, described in section 3.5 above, be-
cause the features of the corporate tax which discriminate among indus-
tries might be offset or exacerbated by the industry-discriminating fea-
tures of personal taxes on interest, dividends, and noncorporate income.
We find that significant welfare gains can be obtained by undertaking this
kind of reform, and that the size of this gain depends on the specifics of
the policy. Also in chapter 8 we discuss the distributional effects of
corporate tax integration.
Other features of the model were designed in order to evaluate the
move to a progressive consumption tax. Labor/leisure choices are re-
quired for second-best evaluation of a comprehensive consumption tax,
as is consideration of intertemporal effects. Chapter 9 shows that the
welfare gain from this reform is of the same order of magnitude as the
gains arising from corporate tax integration. Moreover, in this model,
either reform could provide individual welfare gains to every one of our
twelve income classes. We do not capture possible redistributions among237 Concluding Remarks
groups based on age or other demographic characteristics, but this Pareto
improvement for our twelve income groups is still a significant finding.
Other distributional considerations are discussed below.
Besides particular policy proposals, the model can be used to evaluate
more conceptual tax policy problems. In chapter 10, for example, we use
the model to plot the total government revenue that results from each
possible tax rate on labor income. The resulting Laffer curve, for our
standard elasticity parameters, is sharply upward sloping for our estimate
of the existing tax rate on labor, and it continues to increase up to a 70
percent overall marginal tax rate. Higher labor supply elasticities imply
that the curve peaks at lower marginal tax rates, but the aggregate
elasticity would have to be unreasonably high (about 3.0) before existing
tax rates would put us on the downward-sloping segment of the curve.
All of the results can be sensitive to assumptions and specifications in
the model. One of our most important assumptions, however, is that the
United States has a fixed supply of capital. If instead capital is interna-
tionally mobile, as many have argued, then the impact of taxes could be
substantially different. For this reason, chapter 11 goes on to investigate
four alternatives. In the specification where capital services are highly
mobile across boundaries, investment incentives (such as corporate tax
integration) can be associated with additional investment, capital inflows,
and welfare gains to the United States, while savings incentives (such as
the switch to a consumption tax) can be associated with additional sav-
ings, capital outflows, and welfare losses to the United States.
Elsewhere, the model has been used to evaluate many other policy
problems. Fullerton and Henderson (1983), for instance, examine the
major features of President Reagan's tax policy program, including both
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982. Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) mea-
sure the overall efficiency effects of every United States tax instrument.
For each instrument they simulate its complete removal in order to
measure average excess burden (the ratio of total excess burden to total
revenue), and they simulate a small change in the rate in order to measure
the marginal excess burden (the ratio of the change in excess burden to
the change in revenue). One of the main themes to emerge from this
analysis involves highlighting the efficiency costs of the tax system in
general. Whereas Harberger first suggested that some of these costs were
about one-half of 1 percent of GNP, the results from this model indicate
that the costs are more significant. Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley find
that excess burden is in the range of 20 percent of total revenue, but can
easily approach 50 percent of marginal revenue.
We emphasize that these results are not specific forecasts of the U.S.
economy under alternative policy regimes. Rather, the model should be
viewed as providing a numerical approach to economic theory and policy.238 Chapter Twelve
We use the numerical equilibrium model to provide the same kind of
economic insight that a theoretical model would provide for a simpler
problem that could be solved analytically. We do not use it to predict
actual responses. We look at tax changes with a strong ceteris paribus
assumption, so we do not consider any of the myriad possible nontax
changes that can affect the actual development of the economy.
12.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach
On many occasions throughout this book we have discussed the
strengths and weaknesses of the computational general equilibrium
approach, as well as of our particular model. At this point it is appropri-
ate to review these strengths and weaknesses, and mention some others.
This will help to place our results in perspective.
As a part of this discussion we will refer to many authors who have
relaxed certain assumptions and explored issues that we have not ad-
dressed directly in this book. The field of computational general equilib-
rium (CGE) has grown enormously in recent years, probably because of a
widespread feeling that it has many important advantages. The greatest
advantage of these models is that they are able simultaneously to consider
all interactions in a complex model economy, without ignoring income
effects. This allows us to obtain quantitative answers to questions that
cannot even be posed in a partial equilibrium framework. Policy analysts
who use partial equilibrium techniques are often forced to make a large
number of ceteris paribus qualifications to their results. The CGE
approach allows us to reduce the number of such qualifications that must
be made.
Further advantages of the CGE approach can be seen when it is
compared with the simpler model of general equilibrium popularized, in
the public finance field, by Harberger. As pointed out in chapter 2, the
Harberger model can only be used to analyze changes within a very small
number of sectors, and, strictly speaking, its results are only valid for
small changes in the relevant parameters. The CGE approach allows us
to consider model economies with many dimensions, and it allows us to
look at a tremendously wide range of tax policy changes.
As with any form of economic analysis, our applied general equilib-
rium analysis has its difficulties. These range from general problems
implicit in competitive analysis to specific problems in the choice of
functional form. Let us consider these problems, beginning with the
broader, more general ones.
We assume that all markets are perfectly competitive, that all eco-
nomic agents have complete information about current prices, and that
production is characterized by constant returns to scale. Obviously, each
of these assumptions is contrary to many of our everyday observations239 Concluding Remarks
about the real-world economy. However, we feel that they can be de-
fended in three ways. First, our model is designed to investigate long-run
questions of economic efficiency. There may be long-run tendencies
toward perfect competition and complete information, even if at any
moment these assumptions do not hold throughout the economy.
Second, these assumptions give us analytical and computational tractabil-
ity—the capability to work with a structure that incorporates the main
elements of the economic system but at the same time provides a mecha-
nism for analyzing policy issues. Third, these assumptions are used widely
in the theoretical literature. Our model stands in clear relation to the
existing theoretical literature, and its results can be better understood in
light of that theory.
We also assume full employment of productive factors in a long-run
equilibrium, without any money supply or macroeconomic fluctuations.
This approach seems patently unrealistic, but it allows us to concentrate
on real allocation and distribution problems. Our results are not predic-
tions of any near-term effects or even of long-run occurrences. Instead,
our results should be seen as indicating the effects of one important set of
economic forces that operate in the long run (namely, taxes), while
abstracting from a number of other forces that might be felt in the
interim. In this sense our results are clearly counterfactual. The only
macroeconomic effects that might be relevant would be those that some-
how affect long-run tendencies.
In general, an important difficulty is the problem of model preselection,
that is, the need to select a particular form for the model before the
analysis can proceed. The results depend crucially on these choices, but
no systematic method exists for making them. The literature simply does
not provide clearly defined specification tests for discriminating among
alternative model variants.
An example of this difficulty arises when we have to choose an assump-
tion about consumer expectations regarding future prices and tax rates.
Expectations might be myopic, as in this model, or perfectly accurate as
in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983). Ballard and Goulder (1982) investi-
gate the importance of this issue by varying the degree of consumer
foresight in an otherwise unchanged version of the model in this book,
and they find reasonable robustness in our results.
Another example of model preselection involves the assumption about
international capital flows. In analyzing the incidence of the corporate
tax, Harberger (1962) assumed a fixed domestic capital stock. He found
that, in spite of intersectoral differences in tax rates and the ability of
capital to shift between sectors, capital bears the full burden of the tax.
Other authors have pointed out, however, that alternative assumptions
can totally change the conclusion. If we assume that capital is interna-
tionally mobile and that the economy under consideration is small rela-240 Chapter Twelve
tive to world capital markets, then the supply function for capital is
perfectly elastic. The price of capital cannot change as taxes are re-
formed, so domestic capital owners are unaffected. Tax burdens are
borne instead by internationally immobile factors such as labor.
We place our model in the original Harberger tradition by assuming
that capital is immobile between nations but perfectly mobile among
sectors. The first assumption is relaxed in chapter 11, and we find sensitiv-
ity in the results as suggested above. The second assumption, about
intersectoral mobility, is relaxed by Fullerton (1983). The welfare gain
from corporate tax integration is somewhat diminished in this alternative
model where capital takes time to relocate, but the basic results are fairly
robust.
Some particularly important structural problems involve the ways in
which the various taxes are modeled. Any particular tax must be repre-
sented in model-equivalent form, and there are generally several accept-
able ways to do this. In our model we represent each tax as an ad valorem
tax, and these rates are built into the model structure. Yet the public
finance literature generally suggests alternative analyses of nearly all of
the major taxes that make up our tax system. The corporate income tax,
for example, has been treated as a partial factor tax by Harberger (1962),
as a lump-sum tax by Stiglitz (1973), and as an instrument of risk sharing
by Gordon (1981). Whichever of these treatments is adopted will in-
fluence the conclusions from the model. When Fullerton and Gordon
(1983) build the risk-sharing view into a model that is otherwise identical
to the one in this book, they obtain substantially different results. Instead
of providing welfare gains, the integration of corporate and personal
taxes results in a net welfare loss. (More discussion of this alternative is
provided in section 3.2.)
The property tax, as another example, has been viewed as an excise tax
on housing and more recently as a tax on the return to capital employed in
particular industries. We adopt this new view of the state and local
property tax, and our equilibrium model allows the partial factor tax to
have excise effects on the price of output in any industry where the
property tax is higher than average (e.g., the housing industry). How-
ever, the tax may be systematically related to benefits. If individuals and
firms are mobile among a large number of local jurisdictions, and if local
public goods provide no spillover benefits to other jurisdictions, as in a
Teibout (1956) equilibrium, then tax payments would be exactly matched
by benefits received. The tax in this analysis is a payment for services, not
a distorting wedge.
In spite of these many difficulties, it still is necessary to analyze the tax
system so that tax policies can be formulated more intelligently. We
believe that a major contribution of this book is the explicit discussion of241 Concluding Remarks
the various modeling choices. The reader can then consider these choices
in evaluating our conclusions.
Even more specific are the problems involved in choosing functional
forms and parameter values. We have chosen CES functions because
they are analytically tractable and because they allow us to incorporate
key elasticity parameters easily. In the absence of substantial agreement
in the literature about the values of some of these parameters, we want to
be able to vary them in sensitivity analysis. The best we are able to do is to
use the existing literature to choose a single best-guess value, as well as a
wider range of values that might be deemed reasonable. Through the use
of alternative values, we assess whether the policy conclusions are robust.
For many tax reforms, such as corporate tax integration, we find that
the welfare gains are an upward-sloping function of the assumed saving
elasticity (described in section 6.4.3). No single reform always dominates
all other reforms when we compare them on the basis of the welfare gain.
Fullerton and Lyon (1983) find that, even within a fairly narrow range,
the choice for the saving elasticity parameter value is directly linked to
the choice of reform (if that choice is based on welfare gains).
It might be argued that the range of estimates for some of the param-
eters is so great that our model can only be of limited use as a guide to
policy. We would respond to this claim in two ways. First, the main
themes of our results are not altered by changes in the elasticities.
Corporate tax integration and the consumption tax generate substantial
welfare gains, regardless of the saving elasticity. Second, the need to
make policy decisions leads us to do the best we can, given currently
available estimates and techniques. We would very much like to have
improved elasticity values on which to base our calculations, but in the
absence of more reliable estimates, our sensitivity analyses give a good
feel for the likely range of responses to the policy change.
12.3 Directions for Future Research
The ultimate value of a model such as this one hinges both on the
believability of the calculations and on their usefulness to policy analysts.
It is easy to dismiss such exercises as worthless on the grounds that the
assumptions are crude, the data are poor, and the model is preselected
(i.e., the particular treatment of each policy instrument has been adopted
before the calculations have been made). Nevertheless, we are faced with
a policy environment where decisions must be made. If little or no
modeling activity takes place, then the analytical structure of conven-
tional economic theory is not being brought to bear fully in making policy
decisions. We suggest that our model, and other models like it, have an
important role in the policy-making process.242 Chapter Twelve
Still, much is left to be done. For example, the numerical specifications
of these models are unpalatable to many econometricians. The models
are not estimated with any statistical techniques, and no tests apply to the
choice of specification. As a consequence, one major contribution would
be the econometric estimation of a complete model of this type. Jorgen-
son (1984) has embarked on one such econometric specification of a
general equilibrium model. Mansur and Whalley (1984) discuss this
estimation issue, and they conclude that it may well be impossible to
estimate an applied general equilibrium model of large dimension using a
complete estimation procedure that incorporates all restrictions on pa-
rameters. They suggest that such models will never be estimated without
some partitioning of the parameter values. As a consequence, the state of
the art will probably continue to include some recourse to extraneous
parameter estimation or specification through literature search.
The dynamic structure of these models is another area in which con-
siderable research is now taking place. The models developed thus far
have predominately been static. Although we have gone further in this
book in examining sequenced general equilibrium models, we still
assume a world in which consumers live forever. Adoption of an explicit
life-cycle structure would be a welcome addition to the analysis of many
intertemporal issues. The work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) pro-
vided this type of structure for the first time. Ballard (1983) has continued
by extending the model used in this book to include overlapping genera-
tions of life-cycle consumers. Each generation receives inheritances, and
each gains utility from bequests. The generations are of different sizes,
reflecting the baby boom phenomenon. Ballard finds that the consump-
tion tax leads to welfare gains for every cohort, although the gains are
generally somewhat less than the gains found in this book. Although
Auerbach-Kotlikoff and Ballard differentiate among consumers of dif-
ferent ages, no CGE model has yet differentiated among consumers of
the same age across different levels of income or wealth.
Another important research priority is to improve the specification of
tax rate parameters, since these can affect the results crucially. A more
complete incorporation of recent work on effective tax rates would
therefore be an advance. (A summary review of such studies is provided
in Fullerton 1984).
Finally, at this point, we note a number of researchers who are cur-
rently suggesting areas for further study. Feltenstein (1984), for example,
is working on a general equilibrium model with money and bonds. Many
researchers find bonds to be a useful addition to an otherwise real
equilibrium model, because their existence allows the government to
spend more real resources than it collects in real taxes. An example is the
model of Mexico by Serra-Puche (1984), a model that also includes
unemployment of labor. Willig (1983) has begun to investigate imperfect243 Concluding Remarks
competition in an equilibrium model, and Bovenberg (1983) is working
further on a model of imperfectly mobile capital with installation costs.
Even within the competitive equilibrium framework, one can learn
from the disaggregation of productive factors, as in Keller (1980), or of
sectors, as in Dixon, Parmenter, and Rimmer (1984). Other studies have
emphasized detailed treatments of particular sectors such as the energy
sector in Jorgenson (1984) or Borges and Goulder (1984). One could
proceed to study the allocative significance of particular deductions in the
personal tax, public goods that are nonrival in consumption, or externali-
ties as additional distortions in production or consumption. In addition,
we are always in need of more recent data or evidence on producer
behavior, consumer behavior, saving behavior, and expectations.
This is only a partial list of the many avenues along which research is
now being carried out. Many more exciting areas of research have not yet
been explored. Ultimately, these models will prove worthwhile if they
shed light on economic questions previously not well understood, and if
they contribute to the rational formulation of economic policy. We
believe that these models have been successful on both counts, and that
the use of these models not only will continue but will expand.